Central banks typically raise short-term interest rates to defend currency pegs. Higher interest rates, however, often lead to a credit crunch and an output contraction. We model this trade-off in an optimizing, first-generation model in which the crisis may be delayed but is ultimately inevitable.
Introduction
The last …fteen years have witnessed a succession of currency crises, ranging from the EMS crises in 1992 to similar episodes in Mexico (1994) , Asia (1997) , Russia (1998) , Brazil (1999) , and Argentina (2001) . Given the economic dislocations that inevitably accompany a balance of payments (BOP) crisis, the design of appropriate policies to …ght and prevent such occurrences is an issue of critical importance to policymakers and academics alike. As casual evidence makes abundantly clear, the standard …rst line of defense against mounting pressure on an exchange rate peg is to raise short-term interest rates. In fact, higher interest rates to defend a peg (or, more generally, strengthen the domestic currency) are a standard component of IMF programs, as implemented in Russia, Brazil, and most Asian countries (Fischer, 1998) . The desirability of such policies, however, has become a matter of intense debate in the policy arena. 1 The standard rationale among policymakers for raising short-term interest rates is to make domestic-currency denominated assets more attractive (hereafter referred to as the "money demand e¤ect"). This should slow down (or, hopefully, stop altogether) the loss of reserves under a pegged exchange rate. On the cost side, both proponents and detractors essentially agree that a high interest rate policy entails mainly three type of costs: (i) a …scal cost in the form of a higher operational de…cit, which results from higher interest rates on public debt; (ii) an output cost, as high interest rates lead to a credit crunch and an output contraction; and (iii) a further deterioration of an already weak banking system (when applicable). The policy debate centers on the implicit assessment of the bene…ts versus the costs of higher interest rates, with proponents emphasizing the short-run bene…ts of currency stability and detractors focusing on the magnitude of the costs. 1 IMF critics like Je¤ Sachs and Joe Stiglitz, for instance, have vehemently argued against high interest rate policies in numerous pieces in the …nancial press. 1 For all the practical importance of this issue, there was until recently little, if any, academic work focusing explicitly on this debate. The seminal work on currency crises by Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984) -and most of the ensuing literature -gives no role to the monetary authority in …ghting a potential crisis, as it implicitly assumes that policymakers sit passively as they watch international reserves dwindle down until the …nal speculative attack wipes them out completely. Only recently has an incipient theoretical literature begun to explicitly address this topic. 2 In particular, in Lahiri and Végh (2003) , we analyze the e¤ectiveness and optimality of raising short-term interest rates to defend a peg by focusing on the trade-o¤ between the money demand e¤ect and the …scal cost. We
show that higher interest rates may indeed delay a BOP crisis -which in practice may buy precious time for policymakers to address the fundamental imbalances. Raising interest rates beyond a certain point, however, may actually bring the crisis forward as the …scal e¤ect begins to dominate the money demand e¤ect. There is thus some increase in interest rates that will maximize the delay. We also show, however, that it is not optimal to delay the crisis as much as possible. Our analysis thus validates some of the critics'concerns about the perils of higher interest rates, while still o¤ering a formal rationale for the monetary authority to play an active role in defending a currency peg. 3 However, our analysis in that paper abstracts completely from output e¤ects of higher interest rates. 2 See Drazen (2003) , Flood and Jeanne (2005) , and Lahiri and Végh (2003) . Empirically, the evidence on the e¤ectiveness of higher interest rates in defending/strengthening the domestic currency is mixed (see, for example, Dekle, Hsiao, and Wang (2001) and Kraay (2001) ). 3 Flood and Jeanne (2005) also focus on the …scal costs of higher interest rates. Drazen (2003) , on the other hand, looks at the signalling e¤ects of higher interest rates. Our analysis is also related to Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001a) , where the government can delay the time of the crisis by further borrowing (which implies higher interest rates in the future) but, unlike in our model, there are no bene…ts from doing so.
In this paper, we focus our attention on the output costs of higher interest rates, which is arguably the most important channel. As Figure 1 illustrates for four emerging economies that have actively defended their currencies by raising short-term interest rates, higher interest rates are typically associated with an output contraction (with vertical lines in the …gures denoting periods of active interest rate defense). 4 Figure 2 illustrates, in turn, the link between credit contractions and higher interest rates. The …gure suggests that higher interest rates depress the economy through a credit channel.
We address the trade-o¤ between the money demand e¤ect and the output e¤ect in the context of an otherwise standard, optimizing, small open economy that is prone to Krugman-type crises. 5 To this e¤ect, we incorporate a credit channel by assuming that …rms are dependent on bank credit for their productive activities, while banks need deposits to make loans. Following Calvo and Végh (1995) , we model interest rate policy as the monetary authority's ability to set the interest rate on an interest-bearing liability (a nontraded domestic bond). We assume that this domestic bond is held only by domestic commercial banks. Raising the interest rate on this domestic bond increases both the lending rate to …rms as well as the deposit rate paid to depositors. The latter e¤ect increases money demand (de…ned as the demand for demand deposits) and may postpone the time of the attack. The higher lending rate, however, reduces bank credit to …rms and, hence, extracts an output cost by reducing employment and output. 6 4 The data for Figures 1 and 2 comes from the IMF's International Financial Statistics. For detailed evidence on the contractionary e¤ects of currency crises, see Calvo and Reinhart (1999) and Gupta, Mishra, and Sahay (2002). 5 By a Krugman-type crisis, we mean an environment in which the central bank …xes the exchange rate but follows an expansionary domestic credit policy. 6 We should note that the mechanism through which an interest rate defense works in our set-up is di¤erent from another, more common, channel. Under our mechanism, the interest rate defense works by raising the demand for the domestic money base. This reduces the size of the attack at the time of the crisis and thereby 3 Within this model, our main question is: given the Krugman distortion (i.e., an unsustainable …xed exchange rate), can policymakers delay the crisis by raising interest rates?
And, if so, what is the optimal interest rate defense? To answer these questions, we …rst distinguish between two types of interest rate defense (both of which are announced as of time zero): (i) a contemporaneous interest rate defense of the peg whereby the monetary authority announces that it will raise the domestic interest rate only when the market interest rate rises; and (ii) a preemptive interest rate defense of the peg whereby the monetary authority raises the domestic interest rate before the crisis actually occurs.
We show that both the preemptive and the contemporaneous interest rate defense succeed in delaying the crisis (at the cost of a fall in output) but only up to a certain point. Beyond some critical level, raising interest rates further may actually bring the crisis forward. We then show that -relative to the no-defense case -it is always optimal to announce high interest rates both before and at the time of the crisis. Hence, it is not optimal for the central bank to remain passive as its reserves dwindle, as implicitly assumed by …rst-generation models of BOP crises. Furthermore, at an optimum, higher interest rates at the time of the crisis would succeed in further delaying the crisis but such a policy would obviously not be optimal.
In sum, our model provides a simple framework to think about the trade-o¤s involved in an active interest rate defense of a peg. It suggests that there is indeed a role for an active postpones the attack. In the alternative view, interest rate defenses work by raising the cost of speculation to the point where the additional cost of speculation o¤sets the expected devaluation of the currency. In our perfect foresight environment, there is no discrete devaluation and thus this channel does not apply. In any event, this alternative mechanism has been critiqued on the grounds that, to be e¤ective in deterring speculators, interest rates must be raised to unreasonable levels. Thus, Drazen (1993) argues that "... even if foreign currency assets bore no interest, an expected overnight devaluation of 0.5 percent would require an annual interest rate over 500 percent ((1.005) 365 -1) x 100 = 517) to make speculation unpro…table." interest rate defense, thus calling into question the policy relevance of models that assume away this policy option. The presence of output costs, however, imposes clear limits to the use of higher interest rates, which are captured in the model by the fact that the time of the crisis is a non-monotonic function (inverted U) of the level of interest rates. While, by necessity, the model abstracts from many other relevant channels in practice, we believe that it captures an essential trade-o¤ between the costs and bene…ts of delaying a crisis.
Before proceeding further, some remarks about our modelling strategy are in order. In any open economy set-up, allowing for an independent interest rate policy channel to co-exist with an independent exchange rate policy involves deviating from the assumption of perfect substitutability between domestic and foreign assets. In our model this is accomplished by introducing a non-traded domestic bond that is held only by domestic banks, which in turn cannot hold foreign bonds. Within this structure, if we allowed any subset of agents to simultaneously hold both domestic and foreign bonds, the no-arbitrage condition would immediately equalize domestic and foreign returns and hence eliminate the central bank's ability to independently set the interest rate on domestic bonds. While this assumption seems stark, it is not as restrictive as might seem at …rst glance. There are alternative ways of breaking the no-arbitrage relationship without changing the key underlying mechanism through which an interest rate defense works in the model. Thus, as in Calvo and Végh (1995) , we could allow households to hold these domestic bonds along with the foreign bonds but assume that these domestic bonds provide liquidity services, i.e., one can write checks on these holdings. Alternatively, one could allow banks to also hold foreign bonds but introduce a costly banking technology as in Edwards and Végh (1997) wherein banks face a cost of managing domestic assets. Under either of these scenarios, this paper's results would carry through.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the model, while Section 3 works out the mechanics of a BOP crisis under a passive interest rate policy. Section 4 analyzes the e¤ects of an active interest rate defense on output and the timing of the crisis. Section 5 derives the optimal interest rate defense of the peg. Section 6 concludes.
The model
Consider a small open economy that is perfectly integrated with the rest of the world in goods markets. The economy is inhabited by an in…nitely-lived representative household that receives utility from consuming a perishable good and disutility from supplying labor.
The world price of the good in terms of foreign currency is …xed and normalized to unity.
Free goods mobility across borders implies that the law of one price holds. The consumer can also trade freely in perfectly competitive world capital markets by buying and selling an international bond. These international bonds are denominated in terms of the good and pay a constant r units of the good as interest at every point in time.
Households
The household maximizes lifetime welfare, which is given by
where c denotes consumption, x is labor supply, is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1 is the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the real wage (as will become evident below), and (> 0) is the exogenous and constant rate of time preference. These preferences are well-known from the work of Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu¤man (1988) and have been widely used in the real business cycle literature, as they provide a better description of consumption and the trade balance for small open economies 6 than alternative speci…cations (see, for instance, Correia, Neves, and Rebelo (1995) ). In our case, we adopt these preferences for analytical tractability since it will enable us to derive our key results analytically. 7 Households use interest-bearing demand deposits to reduce transactions costs. For simplicity, we will assume that transactions costs depend only on real demand deposits (but not on consumption). Speci…cally, the transactions costs technology takes the standard form
where s denotes the non-negative transactions costs incurred by the consumer and h denotes real interest-bearing demand deposits. Additional real demand deposits reduce transactions costs, but at a decreasing rate. Formally:
The assumption that 0 (h ) = 0 for some …nite value of h (= h ) ensures that the consumer can be satiated with real money balances (i.e., the Friedman rule can be implemented). At that point, transactions costs are assumed to be zero.
In addition to demand deposits, households can hold an internationally-traded bond (b).
Real …nancial wealth at time t is thus given by a t = b t + h t . We denote the deposit rate by i d . No arbitrage on the internationally-traded bond implies that the nominal interest rate is given by i = r + ", where " denotes the rate of devaluation. Hence, the opportunity cost of holding demand deposits is I d i i d (the deposit spread). 8 The ‡ow budget constraint facing the representative household is thus given by 7 The key analytical simpli…cation introduced by GHH preferences is that there is no wealth e¤ect on labor supply. 8 It will be assumed throughout that I d 0.
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where w denotes the real wage, are lump sum transfers received from the government, while f and b denote dividends received from …rms and banks, respectively. Integrating
(3) and imposing the standard transversality condition yields the household's lifetime budget constraint:
The household chooses paths for fc t ; x t ; h t g to maximize lifetime utility (1) subject to (2) and (4), taking as given a 0 , r, and the paths for I d t ; w t ; f t ; and b t . The …rst-order conditions for this problem are given by (assuming, as usual, that = r):
where is the (time-invariant) Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (4). Equation (5) says that the marginal utility of consumption is constant along a perfect foresight equilibrium path. Equation (6) shows that labor supply depends positively on the real wage, w.
Finally, equation (7) implicitly de…nes the demand for real demand deposits as a decreasing function of their opportunity cost, I d :
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Firms
The representative …rm's production function is assumed to be linear in labor: 9
Firms are assumed to face a "credit-in-advance" constraint, in the sense that they need to borrow from banks to pay the wage bill. 10 Formally:
where n denotes bank loans. 11 The assumption that …rms must use bank credit to pay the wage bill is needed to generate a demand for bank loans.
Firms may also hold foreign bonds, b f . Thus, the real …nancial wealth of the representative …rm at time t is given by a f t = b f t n t . Using i`to denote the lending rate charged by banks and letting I` i` i denote the lending spread, we can write the ‡ow constraint faced by the …rm as
It is easy to see from equation (12) that w t x t It (= It n t ) is the additional …nancial cost incurred by …rms due to the fact that they need to borrow from banks to pay the wage bill.
Integrating forward equation (12), imposing the standard transversality condition, and using equation (10) yields
The …rm chooses a path of x to maximize the present discounted value of dividends, which is given by the right hand side of equation (13), taking as given a f 0 , r, and the paths for w t and It . The …rst-order condition for this problem is given by
Intuitively, at an optimum, the …rm equates the marginal productivity of labor (unity) to the marginal cost of an additional unit of labor, given by the real wage, w t , plus the associated …nancial cost, w t It .
Banks
The economy is assumed to have a perfectly competitive banking sector. The representative bank accepts deposits from consumers and lends to both …rms (n) and the government (z) in the form of domestic government bonds. 12 The bank charges an interest rate of i`to …rms and earns i g on government bonds. It also holds required cash reserves, m (high powered money). The bank pays depositors an interest rate of i d . Assuming, for simplicity, that banks'net worth is zero, the balance sheet identity implies that m t + n t + z t = h t . As noted in the introduction, the assumption that domestic banks do not hold foreign assets is key to the ability of the central bank to independently set the domestic interest rate. 13 12 Commercial bank lending to governments is particular common in developing countries (see, for instance, Calvo and Végh (1995) and the references therein). Government debt is held not only as compulsory (and remunerated) reserve requirements but also voluntarily due to the lack of pro…table investment opportunities in crisis-prone countries. 13 Similar results would go through if we allowed banks to hold foreign bonds as long as they faced a cost of managing domestic assets (along the lines of Edwards and Végh (1997), Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001b), or Agenor and Aizenman (1999)). We chose the speci…cation with no foreign borrowing because it is analytically simpler.
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The ‡ow constraint faced by the bank is then given by
It is assumed that the central bank imposes a reserve-requirement ratio > 0. Since required reserves do not earn interest, at an optimum the bank will not hold any excess reserves.
Hence, we must have
Equation (16) implies that the representative commercial bank's balance sheet identity can be written as
The representative bank maximizes pro…ts given by equation (15) by choosing sequences of n t ; z t ; h t and m t subject to equations (16) and (17), taking as given the paths of i`t, i g t , i d t ;
and " t . The …rst-order conditions for the banks'optimization problem are
Since the banks do not control any of the interest rates, conditions (18) and (19) should be interpreted as competitive equilibrium conditions. In this light, conditions (18) and (19) say that, in equilibrium, the deposit rate(i d ) -which captures the marginal cost of deposits for the banks -will be equal to the marginal revenue from an extra unit of deposits. Since the banks can only lend a fraction 1 of deposits, the marginal revenue is either (1 ) i`t or
Clearly, from (18) and (19), it follows that
Intuitively, loans and government bonds are perfect substitutes in the bank's asset portfolio.
Since the bank can get i g by lending to the government, it must receive at least as much from …rms in order to extend loans to them. Hence, in equilibrium, any change in the domestic interest rate i g will automatically translate into a rise in the lending rate, i`. Further, from (19) , it follows that a rise in i g will also lead to a higher deposit rate for consumers and, hence, an increase in demand deposits.
Government
The government comprises the monetary and the …scal authority. For simplicity, it will be assumed that the monetary authority issues both high powered money, m; and domestic bonds, z. The monetary authority also pays interest on these bonds, i g , holds interestbearing foreign exchange reserves, f , and sets the reserve requirement ratio, . The …scal authority makes lump-sum transfers, ; to the public. We assume that these …scal transfers are …xed and invariant over time. Hence, t = for all t. The consolidated government's ‡ow budget constraint is thus given by
Note that the in ‡ation tax is given by " t m t in the case of high powered money (which is only held by banks in this economy) and (" t i g t )z t in the case of domestic bonds.
Let d denote the stock of real domestic credit. Since the monetary authority issues interest-bearing debt, its net domestic credit, d n , is given by d z. We assume that the government's domestic credit policy consists of setting a rate of growth for net domestic credit:
Using these two facts, equation (21) can be rewritten as:
Finally, integrating forward (21) and imposing the no-Ponzi games condition yields:
where the last term on the RHS allows for the possibility of a discrete change in real liabilities at some time t = T . 14 We also assume that the initial stock of net domestic credit and initial real money demand are such that f 0 > 0.
Equilibrium relations
The …rm's optimality condition (equation (14)) implies that, in equilibrium, the real wage is given by
Intuitively, a higher I`makes bank credit more expensive for …rms, which increases production costs and, hence, reduces …rms'demand for labor, thus lowering the real wage. We can combine equations (6) and (25) to get
which shows that, at an optimum, a higher lending spread must reduce employment, x.
Equation (26) implies that equilibrium employment is given by
The equilibrium amount of loans in this economy is given by (as follows from (25) and (26) and the fact that n = wx) n t = 1
(28)
The crucial feature to note from equations (26) and (28) is that a rise in the lending spread induces a fall in output and in bank credit. Hence, a recession in this economy is characterized by a rise in the lending spread which, in turn, is linked one-for-one with the domestic interest rate, i g . Since equation (20) implies that I g = I l for all t, one can use equation (28) to express the demand for loans as
Lastly, by combining the ‡ow constraints for the consumer, the …rm, the bank, and the government (equations (3), (12), (15) and (21)) and using equations (10), (11) , and (16), we get the economy's ‡ow resource constraint:
where k = b + b f + f . Note that the RHS of equation (30) is simply the current account.
Integrating forward subject to the No-Ponzi game condition yields
Exchange rate and interest rate policy
As in standard …rst-generation currency crisis models, we assume that at t = 0 the exchange rate is …xed at the level E. In addition, it is assumed that there is a critical lower bound for international reserves (say, f t = 0). It is known by all agents at t = 0 that, if and when that critical level of reserves is reached, the central bank will cease to intervene in the foreign exchange market and will allow the exchange rate to ‡oat freely. As a matter of terminology, we will refer to the switch from the …xed exchange rate to the ‡oating rate as a "crisis".
The key feature of our model is that, in addition to …xing the exchange rate, the central bank can also set the path for the interest rate on the domestic bond, i g (referred to as the "domestic" interest rate). Importantly, setting i g implies that the central bank allows the composition of its liabilities (non-interest bearing monetary base and interest bearing domestic bonds) to be market determined. Alternatively, of course, the central bank could set the composition of its liabilities and let i g be market determined. In what follows below, we shall assume that i g is the central bank's policy instrument while the composition of its liabilities is determined endogenously. Moreover, we shall restrict attention to piecewise ‡at paths for i g .
As noted above, the ability of the central bank to independently set a path for the domestic interest rate stems from our assumption that domestic bonds are held only by domestic banks which, in turn, cannot hold any foreign bonds. Hence, di¤erences in returns on these two assets cannot be arbitraged away through asset trade. However, the nonnegativity restriction on the deposit spread, I d > 0, still imposes the restriction that i g < i 1 . Hence, the central bank cannot choose any arbitrarily-high level of the domestic interest rate. It bears repeating, however, that there are alternative ways of introducing imperfect asset substitutability which preserve the monetary authority's ability to in ‡uence domestic interest rates. Thus, introducing a liquidity service from domestic bonds (as in Calvo and Végh (1995) and Lahiri and Végh (2003) ) or a costly banking technology for managing domestic assets (as in Edwards and Végh (1997) ) would also introduce an endogenous wedge between the foreign and domestic interest rates. The e¤ectiveness of interest rate policy then resides in the ability of the central bank to in ‡uence the wedge by an appropriate choice of policy. Of course, the interpretation of the wedge as well as the precise extent to which the policymaker can manipulate the domestic interest rate would depend on how imperfect asset substitutability is introduced. In the case of liquid bonds, the wedge would be the liquidity services o¤ered by the domestic bonds while in the case of a costly banking technology the wedge would be interpreted as the marginal cost of managing domestic assets.
Even in the context of the model presented here, it is possible to derive an interest parity condition between the domestic interest rate (i g ) and the market interest rate (i).
Speci…cally, use (7) and (19) to obtain
This condition says that, in equilibrium, the domestic interest rate must equal the market interest rate (adjusted by reserve requirements) minus a liquidity premium (given by 0 (ht) 1 > 0). As expected, the liquidity premium is a decreasing function of the stock of demand deposits (recall that 00 > 0). In other words, what enables the government to set a domestic interest rate that di¤ers from the (adjusted) market interest rate is that setting the domestic interest rate e¤ectively amounts to setting the interest rate on demand deposits (i.e., paying interest on money). Since demand deposits provide liquidity, the return required by households to hold them will be below the market interest rate. Hence, a higher domestic rate will be associated with a lower liquidity premium (i.e., a higher level of demand deposits). If demand deposits o¤ered no liquidity services (i.e., 0 = 0), then the domestic interest rate could not di¤er from the adjusted market interest rate. Importantly, this would be true despite the non-tradability of the domestic asset.
As will become clear below, a higher rate on domestic bonds paid by the central bank will have three e¤ects. First, since government bonds and bank credit to …rms are perfect substitutes in the banks' portfolio, a higher interest rate on government bonds will lead to a pari passu increase in the lending rate. This will curtail bank credit and, all else equal, provoke an output contraction. This e¤ect will be referred to as the output e¤ect of interest rate policy. 15 Second, a higher interest rate on domestic bonds will increase the debt servicing burden of the consolidated government which we shall refer to as the …scal e¤ect. 16 Third, the higher interest rate on government bonds will induce banks to also pay a higher rate on bank deposits (recall (19) ). This higher rate on deposits reduces the opportunity cost of holding bank deposits and thus increases demand for bank deposits. We will refer to this as the money demand e¤ect.
Balance of payments crises
This section …rst characterizes the perfect foresight equilibrium path for this economy and then studies the case in which there is no attempt on the part of the monetary authority to engage in an active interest rate defense. We refer to this case as "passive interest rate policy". It provides the natural benchmark for analyzing the e¤ects of active interest rate policy in later sections.
Solving the model
In what follows, we shall focus on stationary environments in which the policy-controlled interest rate, i g , is piecewise constant before and after T (at levels given by i g 0 and i g T , 15 As discussed below, it is important to note that the output e¤ect will also be associated with an indirect …scal e¤ect as commercial banks substitute out of bank lending and into government bonds, which increases the stock of government debt and hence debt service. 16 It should be noted that we could abstract from the …scal e¤ect (by assuming that lump-sum government transfers are endogenous) and that our main results regarding the government's ability to delay a crisis and optimality of an active interest rate defense would still go through (as we show in a previous version of this paper). The …scal e¤ect is needed to obtain the non-monotonicities derived below (for which both the output and the …scal e¤ects must be present).
respectively) but may jump at that date. As is well known from Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984) , the combination of a …xed exchange rate and an initial …scal de…cit makes a BOP crisis inevitable in this economy. To see this, note that a …xed exchange rate implies that the nominal interest rate is constant and given by i t = r. From (18) and (20), it follows that i`and i d will also be constant. Hence, I d (= i i d ) will be constant and, in light of (7), so will demand deposits, h. Further, since I`is constant, by (25), (26), and (28), so will w t , x t , and n t . From (17), it then follows that z t will be constant. Given (16) and the constancy of h t , m t will also be constant. Finally, since x t is constant over time, …rst-order condition (5) implies that c t will be constant as well.
We now turn to the path of international reserves. Since m t and h t are constant over time, equation (21) implies that under a …xed exchange rate (" = 0):
The assumption (which will be maintained throughout the paper) that > rf 0 is a su¢ cient condition for _ f t < 0. In other words, international reserves at the central bank will be falling over time. Furthermore -and as equation (33) makes clear -international reserves will be falling at an increasing rate. Since the lower bound for international reserves will be reached in …nite time, the …xed exchange rate regime is unsustainable. The central bank will thus be forced to abandon the peg at some point in time T and let the exchange rate ‡oat. Fiscal spending remains unchanged at .
In order to derive the perfect foresight path for t T , notice that since reserves fall to zero at t = T , _ f t = f t = 0 for t T , which enables us to rewrite equation (21) as
Taking into account (16) , (17) , and (19) , this last equation becomes
Intuitively, notice that, for a given h -and as follows from the banks'balance sheet (17) -n and z move in opposite direction. Hence, a ‡ow expansion of loans to …rms ( _ n > 0) decreases revenues as it implies a reduction in the ‡ow expansion of government bonds. Similarly, for given h, a higher n implies a smaller stock of bonds which reduces the real debt service.
Time-di¤erentiating equations (7) and (28), using (8) and (29), and substituting the results into (35) yields an equilibrium di¤erential equation in " for t T :
where ñ 0 + 1 00 1 > 0. (Recall that i = r + ", I d = r + " (1 )i g , and I g = i g r ".) In deriving the above, we have used the fact that under stationary policies
It is easy to check that, in a local neighborhood of the steady state, equation (36) n n is the e¤ect of a change in " on net government revenues. If both elasticities are less than unity, then a rise in " increases in ‡ation tax revenues from deposits (…rst term) and, for given h, increases the real debt service (second term) since an increase in " reduces I g . If this overall expression is positive, then equation (36) is unstable around the steady state. Hence, to ensure a unique convergent 17 To simplify the derivation of some results below, we will assume that h is a strictly increasing function of the opportunity cost of holding deposits I d . This property is satis…ed by, among others, Cagan money demands, which provide the best …t for developing countries (see Easterly, Mauro, Schmidt-Hebbel (1995)).
perfect foresight equilibrium path, we shall restrict attention to parameter ranges for which
It follows then that for t T -and along any perfect foresight equilibrium path with constant and i g -" t = " T . A constant " and i g imply that i, I d and I g must all be constant over time. As above, this implies, by (5), (16) , (17), (25), (26), and (28), that c, x, h, n, m;
and z all remain constant as well. Lastly, the constancy of h implies that money demand is constant over time. Since d n = h for all t T , this implies that _ d n t = 0 and t = " T for all t T .
Before proceeding further, it is useful to note that the term 1 I d r I d h h re ‡ects the well-known possibility of a La¤er curve relationship between revenues from money printing and the opportunity cost of holding money. As is standard, and to ensure that the economy is always operating on the "correct"side of the La¤er curve, we will assume throughout that
In order to tie down the equilibrium post-collapse values of all the endogenous variables, we need to determine the values of I d T and " T as functions of the post-collapse policy variables i g T and . We can totally di¤erentiate (37) to implicitly solve for
The sign of this expression is ambiguous. It can be easily checked that 1 R
, which will be our maintained assumption,
Substituting I d T =Ĩ d (I g T ; ) into the bank's …rst-order condition (19) , we can also solve for the stationary depreciation rate " T as an implicit function of I g T , for a given , i.e., 18 It is easy to establish numerically -using Cagan money demand functions -the existence of the case in which I g T >Î g T .
The sign of this expression is, in general, ambiguous.
Lastly, we can substitute"(I g T ; ) into I g T = i g T r " T to implicitly solve for I g T =Ĩ g (i g T ; )
where @Ĩ g @i g
The sign of this expression follows directly from our assumption 1 > I d r I d h and the stability
The key feature to note from equation (40) is that I g T is monotonically increasing in i g T . Hence, each i g T maps into a unique I g T .
The preceding implies that the path of the nominal interest rate is known to be given by (42)
To tie down the time of the crisis it is useful to note that the path for the nominal exchange rate must be continuous, i.e., E cannot jump at T . Letting T denote the instant before the run, the discrete change in central bank liabilities at the moment of the crisis T is given by m T (h T h 0 ), which corresponds to the loss in international reserves since 19 In what follows, we de…ne the size of the loss in reserves as S T m 0 m T .
Thus, by de…nition, S T = m T . Using equation (24) -and taking into account that for t > T , = " T m T + (" T i g T )z T -we obtain, after suitable manipulation,
Passive interest rate policy: The Krugman case
We have purposely set up our model so that it reduces to a standard Krugman model (with an endogenous labor supply) for the case in which policymakers set the domestic interest rate (i g ) equal to the market interest rate (i), which implies that I g 0 = I g T = 0. In this case, the banking sector plays no role and the model delivers the standard results that would arise in a model with no banks and a standard labor-leisure choice. We refer to this case as the "passive interest rate policy"case since policymakers choose not to use their ability to engage in an active interest rate defense (which would require setting the domestic interest rate, i g , above the market rate, i). Notice that I g 0 = I g T = 0 implies, by (20), that I0 = IT = 0 so that …rms do not face a premium for having to resort to bank credit.
The following proposition summarizes the results for this Krugman case: To see that consumption must remain unchanged at T , note that equation (5) implies that 
Active interest rate defense
We now turn to the central focus of the paper; namely, the e¤ects of an active interest rate defense of the peg. By "active", we mean deviating from a passive interest rate policy by setting the domestic interest rate (i g ) above the market interest rate (i), which implies setting 20 Notice that the result that output and consumption remain unchanged at T follows from our assumption that the transactions technology is independent of consumption. If this were not the case, it is easy to show that the rise in I d at T would lead to lower consumption and lower output. By abstracting from this e¤ect (which we do not need for our results to go through), we ensure that all output e¤ects studied below are the result of an active interest rate defense of the peg. a positive I g . (Recall that a passive interest rate policy corresponds to setting I g t = 0:) We allow the monetary authority to set a piece-wise ‡at path for i g t (i.e., it can set both i g 0 and i g T , but not necessarily at the same level). Denoting a passive domestic interest rate by i g (p),
we de…ne the passive interest rate policy path as
r; 0 t < T;
r +"(0; ) t T:
We consider two types of interest rate defense policies. The …rst policy -referred to as a contemporaneous interest rate defense -entails raising i g T above the passive level of i g T (p) (for a given i g 0 ). Note that this amounts to setting a positive I g T . In this case, the domestic interest rate is raised at the time of the crisis (although the policy is announced at time 0).
The second policy -referred to as a preemptive interest rate defense -involves raising i g 0 above i g 0 (p) (for a given i g T ). In this case, the domestic interest rate is raised before the crisis takes place. 21
Contemporaneous interest rate defense
We start by investigating the e¤ects of raising i g T above the passive level i g T (p). The following proposition summarizes the two key e¤ects:
The time of the crisis (T ) is a non-monotonic function of the post-collapse domestic interest rate i g T . In particular, for small increases in i g T above i g T (p) the crisis is delayed relative to the Krugman case. However, further interest rate increases beyond a threshold level{ g T bring the crisis forward. Furthermore, the higher is i g T , the lower is the post-collapse level of output. the post-collapse money demand reduces the size of the attack and, thereby, postpones the time of the attack. The opposite occurs in the event of a decrease in h T . Recall that the opportunity cost of demand deposits is I d r + " i d . A rise in i g , in and of itself, increases the deposit rate, i d -recall that i d = (1 )i g -and therefore tends to reduce I d and increase the demand for h T (the money demand e¤ect). A rising i g , however, tends to increase the post-collapse in ‡ation rate (and hence I d ) for two reasons. First -and as discussed earlier -there is a direct …scal e¤ect since the rise in i g increases the debt service.
Second, there is an indirect …scal e¤ect (associated with the output e¤ect) as a rising i g also raises I g , which in turn induces a fall in bank credit to …rms, n. This e¤ect tends to reduce …scal revenues because the counterpart of a falling n is an increase in z (i.e., an increase in liabilities of the central bank held by commercial banks), which increases the government's debt service. In order to …nance this fall in revenues, the post-collapse in ‡ation rate (i.e., the rate of depreciation) must increase. These two e¤ects tend to increase I d . For all i g >{ g , these two e¤ects dominate and further increases in i g actually raise I d .
The negative output e¤ect of a higher i g T results from the higher lending spread induced by a higher domestic interest rate. The higher lending spread increases the e¤ective real wage, which lowers demand for labor (and hence output) and leads to a lower demand for bank credit. This induces banks to substitute out of loans and into bonds.
Preemptive interest rate defense
We now turn to the e¤ects of a preemptive interest rate defense whereby the pre-crisis interest rate is set at a high level (relative to the passive case). Speci…cally, we investigate the potential trade-o¤s of setting i g 0 > i g 0 (p). Note that this corresponds to a temporary increase in interest rates at date t = 0 which is expected to last till date T . Interest rates are expected to revert back to the passive level i g T (p) at time t T . Hence, we continue to maintain I g T (p) = 0. The following proposition summarizes the main results:
The time of the crisis is potentially a non-monotonic function of the precollapse interest rate i g 0 . Thus, for all i g 0 { g the time of the crisis is unambiguously decreasing in i g 0 . However, for small increases in i g 0 above i g 0 (p), the crisis may be postponed.
The pre-crisis demand for real demand deposits is monotonically increasing while the precrisis output is monotonically decreasing in i g 0 .
Proof. From (20), we know that I0 = I g 0 = i g 0 r. Hence, from (26), it follows that x 0 (and thus output) is decreasing in i g 0 . From (43), it is easy to see that I d 0 is lower than in the Krugman case (since I g 0 is higher), and therefore real demand for deposits is higher. This establishes the last part of the proposition.
Using the commercial bank balance sheet relation z = (1 )h n, we can di¤erentiate equation (44) with respect to i g 0 to get
where (1 ) 1
Denoting the instant before the attack by T , note that S T f 0 = f T f 0 < 0 since reserves are secularly declining over time. 22 Moreover, @h 0 @I d 0 < 0. Hence, 0 is a su¢ cient condition for @T @i g 0 < 0, i.e., for the crisis to be brought forward in time due to an increase in i g 0 . Recalling that 1 T I g +r I g n (I g ) as I g SÎ g ( (1 r) 1) = , it follows that > 0 for all i g
. For < 0 however, the sign of @T @i g 0 is ambiguous. Figure 3 provides a numerical example to show the existence of the case in which there is a range of i g 0 in which @T @i g 0 > 0 for small i g 0 but @T @i g 0 < 0 for all i g 0 beyond a threshold point. 23
As before, the negative output e¤ects of a higher i g 0 is due to the higher lending spread induced by higher domestic interest rates. At the same time, since the opportunity cost of holding demand deposits falls as i g 0 increases, demand for real demand deposits goes up.
To understand the e¤ect of i g 0 on the time of the attack, note that from equation (44) the initial domestic interest rate a¤ects T through two channels. First, it a¤ects T through the e¤ect on the size of the attack S T = m 0 m T . Since m 0 = h 0 is monotonically rising in i g 0 , the size of the attack is increasing in i g 0 . Given a path for reserves, a bigger attack at T implies that the attack must happen sooner since the cuto¤ level for reserves at which the run wipes out remaining reserves is reached sooner. This negative e¤ect on T is captured by the term (1 ) @h 0
However, there is a second e¤ect of i g 0 on T which comes through the e¤ect on i g 0 z 0 . It is easy to check that @i g 0 z 0 @i g 0 . Note that during the …xed exchange rate period, the …scal de…cit is …nanced through the loss of international reserves. Since the initial …scal de…cit is + i g 0 z 0 rf 0 , > 0 implies that the initial de…cit rises with i g 0 which, in turn, implies that reserves decline at a faster rate. Hence, for a given S T the cuto¤ level of reserves is reached faster and the crisis happens earlier. Thus, when > 0 both e¤ects tend to bring the crisis forward and @T @i g 0 is unambiguously negative. For < 0 however, the initial de…cit declines as i g 0 rises. Hence, reserves decline at a slower rate which implies that, for a given S T , the attack must happen later. In this case the …scal e¤ect and the size of the run e¤ect go in opposite directions. Whether the crisis is postponed or brought forward through an increase in i g 0 depends on the net e¤ect. Figure 3 shows the existence of cases where the …scal e¤ect can dominate and the attack can be postponed for small increases in i g 0 .
(As should be obvious, this is just a numerical example and there is no attempt at replicating any particular economy.) 28 5 Optimal interest rate defense
The previous analysis makes clear that while raising interest rates can successfully delay a crisis (up to a point), this bene…cial e¤ect comes at the cost of a fall in output. The obvious question then arises: given the preexisting distortion of an initial budget de…cit which is inconsistent with a …xed exchange rate, what is the optimal interest rate defense of the peg?
To answer this question, notice that since the paths of consumption and labor may change only at T , household's welfare, given by equation (1), can be expressed as
Given that the multiplier is constant along any perfect foresight path, …rst-order condition (5) implies that c 0 x 0 = c T x T . Combining this with (31), equation (47) can be rewritten as:
Since all endogenous variables in (48) are functions of i g 0 and i g T , welfare is maximized by the solution to the following problem:
and I d T = i T (1 )I g T ; as follows from (8) S 0 as i g T S{ g and that
Hence, this last condition implies that level of …scal transfers are so high that the lowest possible value for I d T is positive.
Di¤erentiating (49) with respect to i g 0 and i g T gives:
(50)
(51)
and where we have used the …rst-order conditions for money demand and labor.
To focus on the intuition, consider for a moment interior solutions (i.e., think of (50) and
(51) as holding with equality). At an optimum, the government equates the marginal costs and bene…ts of a higher i g 0 and i g T . What are the marginal costs and bene…ts of increasing i g 0 (i.e., preemptive interest rate defense)? The two terms on the RHS of (50) capture the marginal cost and marginal bene…t of raising i g 0 . Consider the …rst term within the square brackets. A higher i g 0 leads to a higher lending spread (a higher I0). This, in turn, increases the e¤ective real wage and thus reduces labor. Lower labor implies less output (a negative e¤ect) but less disutility from labor (a positive e¤ect). The second (non-negative) term in the square brackets in (50) captures one bene…t of raising i g 0 . A higher i g 0 reduces the opportunity cost of holding demand deposits (I d 0 ), thus increasing real demand for deposits and reducing transactions costs. The last term on the RHS re ‡ects a second potential bene…t of raising i g 0 . If a higher preemptive interest rate delays the crisis, i.e.,
then the good times are prolonged which is welfare improving. The trade-o¤s induced by a contemporaneous interest rate defense as captured by equation (51) are exactly analogous. 24 24 Notice that the bene…t from delaying a crisis that is derived through an extension of the good times 30 Having described the trade-o¤s implied by an interest rate defense, we now characterize the key features of the optimal interest rate policy.
Proposition 4 Consider a perfect foresight equilibrium path for a given path of …scal spending, i.e., t = and an initial …scal de…cit, i.e., rf 0 > 0. Given such a path and the announced exchange rate policy, it is always optimal, starting from the passive interest rate case, to set i g T 2 (i g T (p);{ g ). Moreover, the condition
Proof. First note that i g 0 = i g 0 (p) and i g T = i g T (p) correspond to setting I g 0 = I g T = 0. It is easy to see that evaluating equation (51) around I g T = 0 gives @L
Similarly, evaluating equation
0 which is the su¢ cient condition stated in the proposition. Lastly, evaluating equation (51) around i g ={ g gives @L
Proposition 4 says that the optimal pre and post-crisis domestic interest rates are higher than the passive interest rate policy implied by the Krugman case. Hence, it is optimal to engage in some active interest rate defense. Furthermore, at an optimum for the contemporaneous interest rate policy, it is feasible to delay the crisis further but not optimal to do so. 25 applies only if > 0. Otherwise, it re ‡ects a welfare cost. The sign of is, in general, ambiguous and depends on parameters and the optimal policy. 25 It should be noted that in these Krugman-type …rst-generation currency crisis models where BOP crises occur due to an unsustainable …scal stance, the globally optimal policy is to let the exchange rate collapse at time 0 itself, i.e., go to a ‡exible exchange rate right away. This is true in our model as well. Hence, in Proposition 4 we describe the "constrained"optimal interest rate policy which is contingent on the announced exchange rate policy and …scal path. In a related paper, Rebelo and Végh (2002) provide a rationale for delaying the collapse of an exchange rate peg in these …rst-generation models by introducing various costs Intuitively, around the point I g T = 0, there is a …rst-order welfare gain in terms of reducing transaction costs and postponing the crisis but no …rst-order output loss. The trade-o¤s involved for the optimal preemptive interest rate defense are similar. The presence of the su¢ ciency condition for the preemptive case but not for the contemporaneous case simply re ‡ects the fact that under our parameter assumptions the time of the crisis is always increasing in i g T around the passive interest rate policy i g T = i g T (p). However, the absence of a corresponding parameter restriction for the preemptive interest rate policy implies that it is feasible for T to be decreasing in i g 0 around i g 0 (p) -the passive interest rate point. Since j i g 0 =i g 0 (p) > 0, a falling T implies that a preemptive interest rate defense shortens the good times and therefore reduces welfare. We should, however, stress that this condition is only su¢ cient and not necessary for the optimality of engaging in some preemptive interest rate defense.
The last part of the proposition also shows that the contemporaneous interest rate policy that maximizes the delay of the balance of payments crisis is not optimal. In particular, the proposition shows that at the point of maximum delay, the policymaker would do better by reducing i g T a little and thereby allowing the crisis to happen sooner. Intuitively, at the point of maximum delay, a marginal reduction in i g T has only second order e¤ects on the post-collapse demand for deposits (and hence transactions costs and the time of the attack).
On the other hand, the reduction in the interest rate reduces the domestic lending spread which has …rst-order e¤ects on loans and output. Hence, it is not optimal to raise i g T all the way to{ g , which is the point where the delay is maximized. associated with abandoning the peg. 32 
Conclusions
The increasing frequency of BOP crises in disparate parts of the world raises the issue of what is the appropriate policy response to such episodes. In this paper we have looked at an often-used tool to …ght o¤ speculative attacks -higher interest rates. Higher interest rates typically work by increasing the demand for domestic currency assets -the money demand e¤ect. They carry, however, some adverse side-e¤ects. In particular, policymakers are often concerned about the output consequences of an aggressive interest rate defense of an exchange rate peg.
In this paper we have studied a model in which, by increasing the demand for interestbearing deposits, higher interest rates have a positive money demand e¤ect, but also extract an output cost by making bank credit more expensive. We have shown that the time of the crisis may be a non-monotonic function of interest rates, which implies that there is some rise in interest rates (both before and at the time of crisis) that maximizes the delay.
Furthermore, an optimal interest rate defense involves announcing high interest rates both before and at the time of the crisis. Hence, it is always optimal to engage in some active interest rate defense, contrary to the implicit assumption in most of the literature based on Krugman (1979) . In conjunction with our previous work (Lahiri and Végh (2003) ), where we abstracted from output costs and focused solely on …scal costs, the results of this paper suggest cause for extreme caution and restraint in the use of higher interest rates as an instrument for defending exchange rate pegs.
As is true with any model, ours simpli…es a much more complex reality, in which other mechanisms surely come into play. But it is precisely the complex nature of the real world which, in our view, makes it even more valuable to go back to basics and develop simple models that will hopefully capture some essential trade-o¤s and provide some guidance to 33 our thinking. As we view the world, there are three key aspects of reality which are not directly captured in our model. First, policymakers use higher interest rates mainly to buy time to put the …scal house in order. This feature could be captured by assuming that the …scal fundamentals follow some stochastic process whereby, at each point time, there is some exogenous probability that the …scal situation will be resolved. This would increase the bene…ts of postponing the crisis without altering the essential mechanisms. Second, currency crises can lead to a banking crisis, which in turn can worsen the output contraction. This feature could be incorporated along the lines of Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001b) . Finally, we should mention that our framework abstracts from "signalling" considerations (i.e., higher interest rates may convey information about policymakers'ability and/or commitment to defend a peg), which are the focus of Drazen (2003) . Since addressing these signalling considerations naturally requires a di¤erent theoretical framework, we view Drazen's analysis as complementing ours.
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